- Title
- De Julio vs. Vega
- Case
- A.M. No. RTJ-89-406
- Decision Date
- Jul 18, 1991
- A judge is found guilty of oppressive conduct and willful delay in paying a just debt, eroding public faith in the judiciary's ability to administer justice.
276 Phil. 343
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-89-406. July 18, 1991 ] ENRIQUETA GARGAR DE JULIO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Enriqueta Gargar de Julio filed a complaint on June 15, 1989 charging Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega (formerly of the City Court of Olongapo City, now of the Regional Trial Court an Manila) with conduct unbecoming a judge ("hindi karapat-dapat gawain ng isang nanunungkulan huwes, na nagbibigay ng walang pagtitiwala at deskumpiyansa sa mamamayan"). (p. 1, Rollo.)
The records show that in 1977 Judge Benjamin Vega and his wife, Carmelita Vega, leased for a monthly rental of P500, the complainant's building at No. 2706-A Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City, where they operated a bake shop and hot pandesal business on the premises. The lessees used to pay the rent regularly but defaulted beginning
Answering the ejectment complaint, the defendants alleged that no rents were due after July 15, 1977 for they stopped the operation of their bake shop on that date after Judge Vega was promoted to the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
The trial lasted ten (10) years on account of Judge Vega's dilatory tactics compounded by his over-extended testimony (he took the witness stand seven times) while a succession of four different judges took turns presiding over the court. Judgment was rendered by Municipal Judge Emet B. Manalo on
The amount due on the judgment, including legal rate of interest (over a period of ten years) and attorney's fees, was only P4,500, but respondent would not give his lessors the satisfaction of recovering what was due them. He appealed the decision to the
Even after the judgment had become final, its execution was delayed because Judge Vega questioned the computation of the amount due (P4,500). When the writ of execution was presented to him in his office at Malolos, Bulacan (from
The facts of this case limn an unflattering picture of a judge who by abuse of his legal expertise and through dilatory maneuvers, managed to evade and delay the payment of a just debt.
Willful failure to pay a just debt is a serious offense under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the resolution of this Court dated
There is no doubt in the mind of this Court that respondent judge's conduct toward the complainant was oppressive and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He used his position and his legal knowledge to welsh on a just debt and to harrass his creditor. His example erodes public faith in the capacity of courts to administer justice. He violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires that "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega guilty of oppressive conduct and willful delay in paying a just debt (Section 5, Rule 140, Rules of Court as amended). He is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and is hereby warned that a repetition of this misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Padilla, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., join in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla.
Gancayco, J., on leave.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur with the majority opinion in its finding that respondent Judge Benjamin A. G. Vega is guilty of oppressive conduct (in promoting his own personal interest) and of wilful delay in paying a just debt. However, I disagree as to the penalty it imposes on the respondent. I believe that the conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with upholding the law, but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to delay and avoid the payment of a relatively measly sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P4,550.00) which, in the first place, was his just debt, to the prejudice of another, is a dastardly act which deserves the extreme penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the Bench, not just a mere fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Judiciary is one of the three (3) main pillars of our government. It is the last bastion where one seeking justice should find fulfillment. Its members must possess courage, character and conviction in order to inspire public confidence in the courts. In the words of former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench.
The office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is, as the Constitution in no uncertain terms speaks, a public trust. This is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.
Mr. Justice Malcolm identified good judges with men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the two other departments of government.
Judge Vegas conduct, as described in the majority opinion, is, to say the least, reprehensible for he used his legal knowledge to unduly perpetuate his selfish material interest. He lost all awareness that a judge must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. Respondent judge, by his oppressive conduct, has clearly demonstrated his unfitness to dispense justice without fear or favor, as he would not hesitate to cause injury to others to promote his own misplaced personal interest.
Our Judiciary has undergone two (2) reorganizations, namely: the first, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1980, and the second, by force of people power in 1986. These reorganizations had one underlying purpose, i.e., to weed out the bad from the good, so that what might emerge is a Judiciary truly deserving to be called the last bulwark of democracy.
There should be no reason - or is there? - for yet another reorganization to weed out the unfit and undeserving. In this case, we are faced with a judge who had the audacity to use the very same legal tools intended to serve the ends of justice to create injustice. He should not be able to get away with just a fine or what may be likened to a mere slap on the hand. He deserves to be expelled from such an exalted position, for to let him remain will greatly undermine the dignity and credibility of the Judiciary. The felt necessities of time to borrow a phrase from Holmes, dictate that there should be no more delay for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it will not be too much to say that the peoples faith in the administration of justice could be shaken.
I vote for respondent Judges dismissal from the Judiciary.
50 O.G. 147 (1955)
De La Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982, 112 SCRA 294 per Fernando, C.J.
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322
Ompoc vs. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11, September 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 14
Dia-Anonuevo vs. Bercadio, A.M. No. 177-MJ, November 27, 1975, 68 SCRA 81
Report submitted by the Committee on Judicial Reorganization created by Executive Order No. 619-A dated 17 October 1980.